Trust-Aware Peer Sampling: Performance and Privacy Tradeoffs by Frey, Davide et al.
Trust-Aware Peer Sampling: Performance and Privacy
Tradeoffs
Davide Frey, Arnaud Je´gou, Anne-Marie Kermarrec, Michel Raynal, Julien
Stainer
To cite this version:
Davide Frey, Arnaud Je´gou, Anne-Marie Kermarrec, Michel Raynal, Julien Stainer. Trust-
Aware Peer Sampling: Performance and Privacy Tradeoffs. Journal of Theoretical Computer
Science (TCS), Elsevier, 2013. <hal-00872996>
HAL Id: hal-00872996
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-00872996
Submitted on 14 Oct 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Trust-Aware Peer Sampling:
Performance and Privacy Tradeoffs
Davide Freya, Arnaud Jégoua, Anne-Marie Kermarreca,
Michel Raynalb,c, Julien Stainerb
aINRIA-Rennes Bretagne Atlantique, Rennes, France
bIRISA, Université de Rennes 35042 Rennes Cedex, France
cInstitut Universitaire de France
Abstract
The ability to identify people that share one’s own interests is one of the most
interesting promises of the Web 2.0 driving user-centric applications such as
recommendation systems or collaborative marketplaces. To be truly useful,
however, information about other users also needs to be associated with some
notion of trust. Consider a user wishing to sell a concert ticket. Not only must
she find someone who is interested in the concert, but she must also make sure
she can trust this person to pay for it.
This paper addresses the need for trust in user-centric applications by propos-
ing two novel distributed protocols that combine interest-based connections be-
tween users with explicit links obtained from social networks à-la Facebook.
Both protocols build trusted multi-hop paths between users in an explicit so-
cial network supporting the creation of semantic overlays backed up by social
trust. The first protocol, TAPS2 , extends our previous work on TAPS (Trust-
Aware Peer Sampling), by improving the ability to locate trusted nodes. Yet, it
remains vulnerable to attackers wishing to learn about trust values between ar-
bitrary pairs of users. The second protocol, PTAPS (Private TAPS ), improves
TAPS2 with provable privacy guarantees by preventing users from revealing
their friendship links to users that are more than two hops away in the social
network. In addition to proving this privacy property, we evaluate the per-
formance of our protocols through event-based simulations, showing significant
improvements over the state of the art.
1. Introduction
The advent of Online Social Networks (OSN) has shifted the core of Internet
applications from devices to users. Explicit social networks like Facebook , or
LinkedIn enable people to exploit real-world connections in an online setting.
Collaborative tagging applications such as delicious, CiteULike, or flickr form
IA preliminary version of this paper appeared in [1].
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dynamic implicit networks of users on the basis of their online activities, interest
profiles, or search queries. Users can not only access and introduce new available
content but they become themselves accessible through the online infrastructure.
Explicit vs implicit networks. Existing online social networks can be grouped
into two main categories: explicit and implicit. In explicit networks, users
explicitly determine which other users they should be connected to. In Facebook
or MySpace, they issue and accept friendship requests. In Twitter , they decide
that they wish to follow the tweets of specific users. The topology of the resulting
network reflects the choices of users and often consists of links that already exist
between real people. Explicit networks are thus very useful to exploit existing
connections but provide little support for discovering new content [2, 3].
Implicit networks fill this gap by taking an approach which allows users to
discover new content, and acquaintances [4]. They form dynamic communities
by collecting information about collateral activities of users, such as browsing
websites or tagging documents, URLs, or pictures. A given user may or may not
be aware of the other members of her own communities. Other users should be
clearly visible if the purpose of the application is to discover new people, while
they may be hidden for the sake of privacy when they are simply being used as
proxies to access new interesting content. In either case, the ability to establish
new social connections is key to identifying new and useful data.
The problem addressed in this paper: trust. Recent years have seen the emer-
gence of a significant number of research efforts and applications exploring the
power of the explicit and implicit paradigms. Nonetheless, a lot more can be
achieved if both approaches are combined into a single framework. Consider the
following example. John, who lives in London, bought two electronic tickets for
a classical-music concert in Paris, Berenice by Handel, but an unexpected event
makes him and his friend unable to travel to Paris. The concert is tomorrow and
John would like to sell the tickets to someone who can actually attend the event.
Unfortunately, while John has many friends interested in classical music, they
are all based in the United Kingdom. He does know a few people in Paris, but
they are mostly people he met while traveling and who do not share his musical
tastes. He tries calling a few of them but his best bet is Joseph, who claims to
have a friend whose parents often go to classical-music concerts. Unfortunately,
this friend of Joseph is out of town and Joseph does not know how to reach
his parents. As a last resort, John posts a message on a French classical music
forum, linking to an EBay ad. However, none of the classical music fans on the
forum are responsive enough and some of them even become suspicious that the
electronic ticket being sold by this new forum user is actually a fake.
Previous work. In our previous work [1], we introduced Social Market, a system
that could solve John’s problem by combining the information obtained from
implicit and explicit social networks. Social Market consists of the combination
of two gossip-based layers: a trust-aware peer sampling, and a clustering pro-
tocol. The former, TAPS [1] (Trust-Aware Peer Sampling), provides each node
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(user), n, with a continuously changing sample of the network, consisting of a
set of other nodes n′. For each n′, it identifies a path along which n can reach it
using the links of the explicit social network and associates it with an inferred
trust value obtained from the product of the trust values of the links in the
path. The clustering protocol incorporates this information into a similarity-
based implicit social network. This provides each node with information about
which nodes provide the best compromise between trust and profile similarity.
In our example, Social Market allows John to identify someone who, albeit
not knowing him directly, is interested in the concert and trusts him enough
to buy an electronic ticket from him. Specifically, interest similarity allows
John to identify François, a music teacher from Paris who is trying to buy two
tickets for one of his students and himself. The explicit social network instead
highlights that François is actually the cousin of a French colleague of John’s
wife. This allows the two to gain confidence in each other and thus complete a
safe transaction without external help. Despite these interesting features, the
existing versions of Social Market and of its TAPS [1] protocol are vulnerable to
attackers wishing to learn about the trust values between given pairs of users.
This is particularly problematic as an application like Social Market can only
be successful in the presence of a large enough number of users. Attackers
attempting to learn private information such as trust may in fact discourage
users from participating into the system or from providing accurate trust values.
Content of the paper. In this paper, we address this issue by presenting two
novel trust-aware peer sampling protocols, TAPS2 and PTAPS (Private TAPS ),
that improve TAPS [1] on several aspects. First, they incorporate an optimized
view exchange strategy that leads to a more efficient exploration of the network.
Second they bias the peer-sampling process to favor connections between nodes
that have high-trust relationship. Third, they introduce a trust threshold that
discourages, in the case of TAPS2 , or forbids, in the case of PTAPS , commu-
nication between nodes that have poor mutual trust values. Finally, PTAPS
incorporates additional mechanisms designed to provide provable privacy guar-
antees. Our two new protocols identify different trade-offs in the design space
of trust-aware peer sampling. TAPS2 seeks to provide the clustering protocol
with the most trustworthy nodes. PTAPS strikes a balance between this goal
and the need to hide trust values from third parties.
We analyze both protocols in terms of their properties and their performance
by combining theoretical considerations with extensive simulations. Specifically,
we show that our protocols compare favorably with existing solutions by pro-
viding results that are even closer to those obtained by protocols equipped with
global system knowledge. This makes TAPS2 and PTAPS directly applicable
to situations like the social transaction example described above. Moreover, our
results open new directions for making existing gossip-based applications more
robust in the presence of unreliable users.
3
2. System Model and Background
We consider a system consisting of a set of users equipped with intercon-
nected computing devices that enable them to exchange information in the form
of messages. Each user is associated with a user profile that characterizes her
interests, her past behavior, her geographical location, and whatever other in-
formation the user wishes to add. A profile is a vector of strings that can
represent, for example, URLs, words, or phrases. We refer to each such string
as a keyword. Each keyword in a profile is also associated with a counter, its
weight, which counts how many times the keyword has been added to the pro-
file. The weight basically measures how relevant a given keyword is with respect
to the other keywords in the profile. Keywords can be added by the user, or
they can be extracted from her browsing history, as well as from her interaction
with the system. To simplify the notation, we refer to a user and her profile
with the same symbol u ∈ U , where U is the universe of all user profiles. We
also use the terms node and user interchangeably to refer to a user and the
machine associated with her. Profiles can be compared with each other using a
standard similarity metric. Even though the protocols we describe in this paper
can operate using any such metric, we concentrate on the well known cosine
similarity [5], which measures normalized overlap. More precisely we consider
su1,u2 = cos(u1, u2) =
u1 · u2
||u1|| · ||u2||
where u1 and u2 are profile vectors, the scalar product u1 · u2 is the sum of the
products of the scores associated with corresponding items in u1 and u2, and
||u1|| is the norm of vector u1.
2.1. Social Market
Social Market (SM) [1] is a novel distributed application enabling users to
identify previously unknown social acquaintances that, at the same time, are
similar to them and can be trusted through a chain of explicit social connec-
tions, the trusted path. Selecting similar users is crucial when searching for the
right people for a given transaction, but also when building recommendation
or data-dissemination systems. Trust enables the implementation of transac-
tions without external help and increases users’ confidence in recommendation
results. Users interact with Social Market by proposing items that they wish
to exchange with other users. An item can be, for example, an object to sell,
an object to buy, but it can also be a question that is being asked and that
needs an answer. When a user u creates an item, she associates it with an item
profile, similar to what is done in [6]. Structurally, an item profile is identical
to a user profile. Upon creation, the system initializes the item profile to the
corresponding user profile. The user then completes the creation by selecting
which keywords from this profile clone should be kept, which should be removed,
and which, if any, new keywords should be added.
In the example of Section 1, John creates an item for the Handel concert
in Paris. Prompted with a profile that contains, among other things: computer
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(a) Importance of a trusted path: A selects
C, rather than B or D as a neighbor even
if it has a lower similarity value because it
is reachable through a trusted path (high-
trust links).
(b) Exchange of trust information (top)
and Short circuiting of trusted paths (bot-
tom).
Figure 1: Trusted paths.
science, cycling, mountaineering, violin, rock, and classical music, John decides
to keep only violin and classical music in the item profile. He then adds two
more keywords, Paris and Handel, and decides to keep only the latter in his user
profile as he’s not interested in being notified about other items associated with
Paris. Once an item has been created, the goal of Social Market is to lead this
item to meet other users who (i) are interested in the item, (ii) can be trusted
and can trust the creator of the item, and (iii) can be reached through a trusted
path on a social network (Figure 1a).
To make this possible, SM users can create explicit social links. While
similar to friendship links in systems like Facebook, SM links also have an
additional feature: trust. Upon establishing a link, users declare how much they
trust each other by agreeing on a value in (0, 1]. This associates a symmetrical
trust value with each friendship link, resulting in an undirected social graph
with arc weights between 0 and 1. The corresponding values are similar to the
degrees of friendship/confidence specified in some existing social networks such
as CouchSurfing1. In particular, if user A assigns a value close to 0 to the link
to a user B, it does not necessarily mean that A completely distrusts B, but it
may simply mean that A does not know B enough to express a positive opinion.
2.2. Social-Market Architecture
As presented in [1], SM consists of two layers of gossip protocols: TAPS
(Trust Aware Peer Sampling) and TAC (Trust-Aware Clustering). TAPS pro-
vides each node with a sample of the network containing references to other
nodes and associated trust values. TAC uses this information to select the
nodes that offer the best compromise between trust and interest similarity as
shown in Figure 1a. These protocols operate on three data structures: the ex-
plicit view, the taps view, and the tac view. The explicit view, directly
1www.couchsurfing.org is a social community supporting the exchange of accommodation
between its users.
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updated by the user, contains the node’s explicit friends. The taps view, up-
dated by TAPS , contains a continuously changing set of random nodes. Finally,
the tac view is updated by TAC to contain the set of nodes offering the best
trade-off between trust and similarity.
Each entry in any of these three views contains information about a target
node: its IP address and port, its user profile, a timestamp indicating when the
information in the entry was generated, as well as a trusted path and an inferred
trust value. The trusted path is a path leading to the target node and consists
of a chain of other nodes connected by explicit social links. The inferred trust
value is an estimate of the trust that the owner of the view can have in the
target node, and is computed as a combination of the trust values in the trusted
path between them.
Each edge in a trusted path carries some amount of uncertainty about the
trustworthiness of one endpoint with respect to the other even if all the nodes
in the path fully trust each other. To model this, we define the inferred trust
of a path as the product of the trust values of its edges, weighted by a trust
transitivity coefficient, τ , expressing how much a node values other nodes’ rec-
ommendations. Given a path u1, u2..., un, let ti,j be the trust value between
users ui and uj , then the inferred trust between u1 and un is the following.
t˜1,n = τ
n−2
i=n−1∏
i=1
ti,i+1 (1)
The trust transitivity factor, τ , is applied once per recommended link; so for a
path involving n nodes, τ is applied n − 2 times. Lower τ values cause trust
to decay faster with path length. With τ = 0.7 trust decays from 1 to 0.49 in
only three hops. Finally, it is worth observing that in the special case of the
explicit view, the trusted path only contains the target node, and the inferred
trust value is the real trust value toward this node.
2.2.1. Trust-aware peer sampling
TAPS follows the general structure of a peer-sampling protocol [7] and pop-
ulates the taps view with an ever-changing set of references to other nodes.
When a node enters the system, the TAPS layer initializes its taps view by
inserting one entry for each of the node’s explicit neighbors. During the course
of the protocol, these entries are exchanged with entries received from other
nodes. Initially nodes providing new entries will be the node’s explicit friends,
then the node’s friends’ friends, and so on. Periodically, each node contacts
the node with the oldest timestamp2 from either its taps view or its explicit
view, and the two exchange a random half of their respective taps views (if the
target is from the taps view), or of the union of their taps and explicit views
(if the target is from the explicit view). For each entry, a node exchanges
2The choice of the node with the oldest timestamp facilitates the removal of departed nodes
as described in [7].
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information about a path leading to it and the corresponding trust. Ultimately,
this causes the entries in a node’s taps view to include a continuously changing
set of nodes with the associated inferred trust values.
Trust Inference in TAPS. When exchanging views, nodes update the inferred
trust values towards the exchanged nodes according to Equation (1). Moreover,
they achieve this by exchanging only aggregate trust values and not the trust
values of each link in the path. This makes it possible to protect trust infor-
mation from a passive adversary that is curious to learn about trust values,
but that does not actively combine the values of multiple paths to infer those
associated with explicit links. As an example, consider a node A exchanging
information with another node B as shown in the top diagram of Figure 1b.
A sends B a subset of its view as well as the path it has to reach B and the
value it has for tA,B , the inferred trust between A and B. B uses this trust
information to update the inferred trust values before adding the nodes to its
own view. Specifically, let pA,X be the path from A to X, and tA,X be the
associated inferred trust value, then B computes its own path and trust for X,
as follows. First it verifies if it already has a value for tA,B . If so, it keeps the
highest value between the received one and its own. It then uses the selected
tA,B , and compute the resulting path pB,X and trust value tB,X as
pB,X = pB,A · pA,X and tB,X = τtB,AtA,X
where · denotes path concatenation. Similarly, if B already had a path to X
that was better than the XAB path computed above (not shown in the figure),
it would attempt to use it to build a new path to A going through X, and would
keep it if τtB,XtX,A > tB,A.
Dealing with multiple references to the same node. As views evolve, a node
inevitably receives multiple references for the same node. In the presence of
multiple trust values for the same node, X, a node, A, always selects the largest.
Two references for the same node may also contain slight differences in profiles.
A combines the highest trust values with the most recent profile information.
Even if a node opts for the highest trust value when choosing between two
trusted paths for the same node, the trust update mechanism tends to favor the
creation of longer and longer paths, possibly containing loops. For a node A
to be able to choose the shorter of two trusted paths to the same destination,
A must receive the longer path when the shorter one is still in its view. This,
however, is made unlikely by the fact that the contents of a node’s view keep
changing under the effect of the peer-sampling protocol.
Short-Circuiting Trusted Paths. To limit the proliferation of longer and longer
paths, TAPS [1] includes a short-circuiting mechanism [1]. Consider the situ-
ation depicted in the bottom diagram of Figure 1b. Node X holds a reference
to D with a trust value tX,D and a path going through Y and sends it to A.
Node A should combine this with the trust value it has for node X, tA,X , also
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obtained through Y . However, this would lead to a path that uselessly goes
twice through node Y and once through X.
Node A can prevent this by short-circuiting the path thereby also improving
its trust value. Specifically, A knows that the aggregated impact on trust of
the path segment Y X cannot be greater than τn, n being the number of useless
links in the path, each link being counted once for each time it is traversed (n=2
in this case). It can therefore conclude that the trust value of node D as seen
from A, tA,D is at least the following.
tA,D ≥ tA,X · tX,D
τn
2.2.2. Trust-aware clustering
The taps view constitutes the main source of information for SM’s upper
layer: its trust-aware clustering protocol (TAC ). TAC is a variation of well-
known protocols [8, 4] and maintains a tac view that collects the nodes that
offer the best compromise between trust and similarity. Upon receipt of another
node’s view, a node X combines the received view and its own tac view, and
selects the entries associated with the best trade-off between similarity and trust.
Score computation. Using the similarity and the trust it has toward a node
N , a node X can compute a score σX,N as a weighted product between its
trust and its similarity: σX,N = sX,N 2−tX,N,  ∈ [0, 2], where , the trust
weight, determines the importance of trust in the trade-off, tX,N denotes the
trust between X and N and sX,N is the similarity between X and N .
TAC view exchanges. Similar to TAPS [1], each node periodically selects the
node with the oldest timestamp in its tac view and exchanges the content of its
tac view with it. These further exchanges speed up convergence with respect
to only relying on information from the TAPS layer by providing nodes that
tend to have higher similarities.
2.2.3. Trust verification
A final aspect of Social Market is its trust-verification mechanism. While
not an architectural component, this mechanism plays a major role in guaran-
teeing safe transactions based on the information provided by TAPS and TAC .
Specifically, trust verification allows nodes to obtain a confirmation for the trust
values of the entries that have remained in their tac views for at least c cycles
(c = 5 as in [4]). This provides protection from nodes that attempt to cheat on
their trust values when communicating with nodes that are not direct friends.
Consider Figure 1b (bottom): node D could try to enter A’s cluster by making
A believe that it has a high-trust link to node Y . To prevent this, A asks D to
forward a verification message back to A along the trusted path. The message
starts with a trust value of 1. Nodes along the path multiply the message’s
value by τ and by their trust for the node they received the message from. Y
thus multiplies 1 by τtY,D in the example. This process causes the verification
message to reach A with the correct value for tA,D thereby invalidating D’s
cheating attempts.
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2.2.4. Modifications of the explicit view
When two users declare themselves as friends in the social network, both
nodes add an entry corresponding to their new friend in their explicit view.
Once this is done, the new friends will start exchanging their views like with
any of their explicit friends, and no further actions are needed. In the case
of a friendship link removal, the nodes simply remove their old friend from
their explicit view, and remove any path through this friend from their taps
and tac views. That way, they will stop exchanging entries from their explicit
views, and all the paths containing this link will eventually be discarded when
verification messages sent to check these paths will abort.
The remainder of this paper presents novel contributions to the Social-
Market architecture in the form of two new TAPS protocols. The first protocol,
TAPS2 , described in Section 3, features a number of techniques that lead to
significant performance improvements with respect to [1] along with a slightly
lower risk of unauthorized access to trust information. The second, PTAPS ,
presented in Section 4, trades off a fraction of the improved performance to
provide strong privacy guarantees.
3. Trust-Aware Peer Sampling (TAPS2)
TAPS2 improves the performance of the first version of TAPS by discour-
aging the creation of trusted paths with too-low trust values, while limiting the
dissemination of trust information to distant areas of the network using three
new mechanisms. First, it biases view selection to favor the choice of nodes
associated with high trust values, improving view quality and reducing the like-
lihood that a non-trusted distant node may learn a lot about the local topology
of the network. Second, it establishes a dynamic trust threshold to avoid com-
municating with nodes whose trust values are too low to be useful. Finally, it
includes an improved view exchange mechanism leading to better trusted paths.
3.1. Biased View Selection
The first novel technique in TAPS2 is a biased view-selection mechanism. In
TAPS [1], a node that needs to integrate its view with a set of entries received
from another node operates as in a standard peer-sampling protocol. It extracts
a random subset of the union of its own and the received entries and keeps it as
its new view. TAPS2 seeks to improve view quality and provide better privacy
for trust values by biasing the selection of a node’s neighbors towards nodes
associated with higher trust values.
Consider a node a that needs to update its view Va with information received
from another node Vr. First, a computes the union of the two views Va ∪ Vr.
Then it selects nTAPS nodes from Va∪Vr one after the other by associating each
candidate node with a probability obtained by dividing its trust values by the
sum of all the trust values of the nodes in Va ∪ Vr that have not been selected.
Therefore, the probability that a node be in the selected sample increases with
its trust value. This causes the view to be biased towards nodes with higher
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values, leading to two important consequences. First, it reduces the likelihood
that a node with a low trust value may enter the taps view. Second, it yields a
more clustered topology making it less likely for a non-friend with a low trust
value to gather information about the trust between a node and its friends.
3.2. Minimum-Trust Threshold
The second mechanism employed by TAPS2 to limit the dissemination of
trust information and the proliferation of long paths is a dynamic threshold
on trust values. For any node n, this is defined as the minimum trust value
that a hypothetical node n′ with similarity 1 would need to enter n’s clus-
ter. Let σi denote the score of a node i from the cluster view of n, and
let ti and si be respectively their reciprocal trust and similarity values. Be-
cause of the definition of score (∀i : σi = tis2−i ), such a perfectly similar
node would have a score of σn′ = tn′ . For it to enter the cluster view of
n, this score would need to be higher than the lowest score of a node cur-
rently in the view, i.e. tn′ > min{σi, i ∈cluster}, which is equivalent to
tn′ > min{σi, i ∈cluster}1/. Clearly, this minimum requirement also applies
to nodes that have lower similarity values as their scores are necessarily lower
than those of perfectly similar nodes with the same trust values. Thus, because
the goal of the taps view is to feed the corresponding tac view, TAPS2 ignores
all the nodes that have trust values lower than min{σi, i ∈cluster}1/.
This threshold is dynamic: a node recomputes it whenever it modifies its
cluster view. It then removes from its TAPS2 view all the nodes whose trust
values are lower than the threshold, and refuses the insertion in the view of
similarly untrustworthy nodes. This process gets more and more refined as
nodes select the candidates with the best scores as their neighbors. This causes
a corresponding increase in the value of the threshold, making nodes more and
more demanding as their tac views improve.
Finally, it is worth observing that the trust threshold induces a maximal
length for acceptable paths that can be calculated by: dmax = logτ (tmin). Ulti-
mately, this causes the threshold to have a positive impact on the quality of the
taps and tac views because it allows nodes to focus on the parts of the explicit
network in which they can find the best neighbors.
3.3. Continuous path bootstrapping
The final improvement we introduce in TAPS2 is a modification of the view
exchange mechanism. In [1], each node initializes its taps view with its ex-
plicit neighbors. However, when communicating with nodes selected from taps
view, it always exchanges information about nodes extracted from the same
taps view without reintegrating fresh information about its explicit neighbors.
With TAPS2 , we improve this behavior by perpetuating the bootstrap pro-
cess. At each cycle, a node A chooses a communication partner, N , with an
equal probability from either its taps or its explicit view as in TAPS [1].
However, different from [1], it selects each of the entries to send to N with an
equal probability from either of the two views. This leads to four types of ex-
changes: taps-taps, taps-explicit, explicit-explicit, and explicit-taps,
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as opposed to the only three types taps-taps, taps-explicit, and explicit-
explicit available in [1]. The additional exchange type (explicit-taps) causes
information from the explicit view to enter the views of neighbors from the
taps view, thereby making it easier to obtain shorter trusted paths.
4. Privacy-preserving Trust-Aware Peer Sampling (PTAPS)
TAPS2 assumes an honest-but-curious adversary that is also completely
passive. Specifically, the adversary should not actively store information about
trusted paths in order to calculate direct trust values between arbitrary nodes.
TAPS2 , in fact, hides the trust values of the individual segments composing a
trusted path by disclosing only an aggregate trust value. As a consequence, an
adversary, A, that was able to obtain information on a trusted path ABX with
value tX and on another ABXY with value tY could easily compute the trust
value of the link XY , as tX,Y = tYτtX .
To understand the impact of this kind of attack, we ran simulations (we
provide details on our experiments in Section 5.1) in which nodes store the
information they receive and use it to infer the trust values associated with
explicit links. An average node is able to discover the trust values of 40% of the
14000 explicit links in the social network in as little as 1000 cycles.
In this section, we address this vulnerability of TAPS2 with PTAPS , a
protocol that trades off part of TAPS2 ’s ability to discover the best paths for
provable privacy guarantees even with active attackers. We present the details of
the protocol in Section 4.1, and then prove its privacy properties in Section 4.2.
4.1. Protocol Description
PTAPS augments TAPS2 with three novel features. First, it reduces the
amount of information exchanged, to provide provable privacy guarantees. Sec-
ond, it hides the intermediary links of a path from users, thereby preventing the
attack described above. Finally, it strengthens the trust threshold to prevent
all communication with untrusted users.
4.1.1. Non-disclosure of explicit friends.
The goal of PTAPS is to prevent an attacker from inferring the existence of
an explicit link between arbitrary nodes outside its social circle, that is, between
nodes that are at least two hops away from the attacker. The first step in this
direction is to make it impossible to tell which of the paths and trust values
advertised in a view update correspond to a node’s explicit friends. An attacker
that can identify a node’s explicit friends can in fact use their trust values to
infer those associated with the node’s friends’ friends, and so on.
To avoid this problem, PTAPS modifies the exchange mechanism of TAPS2
by allowing a node to have entries corresponding to indirect paths to its explicit
friends in its taps view. This allows nodes to learn alternative longer paths to
their explicit friends, thereby hiding their status of friends from other nodes.
Consider a node n with direct neighbors N(n) that is performing a PTAPS
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exchange with another node p. As in TAPS2 , n chooses p either from its direct
neighbors or from its taps view with equal probability (P (p ∈ N(n)) = P (p ∈
Vtaps) =
1
2 ). If p 6∈ N(n) (p is not an explicit friend), then n selects the entries
to send to p only from its taps view and not from its explicit view. This
achieves the goal of hiding the explicit-friend status of the entries sent to non-
friends during gossip exchanges in two ways. First, it replaces one-hop paths
with longer paths making paths to explicit friends indistinguishable from the
others. Second, it causes the probability of sending a TAPS entry about an
explicit neighbor to be comparable to that associated with other nodes, making
it difficult to guess the identity of friends based on statistical attacks.
However, nodes use this modified exchange mechanism only when exchanging
information with non-friends. It is easy to see that a node must know the
identities of its friends’ friends in order to bootstrap the process. As a result,
if p ∈ N(n) (p is an explicit friend) n continues to operate as in TAPS2 and
chooses a view to send to p by selecting each entry with equal probability from
the taps or the explicit view.
4.1.2. Trusted-path protection
Being unable to identify another node’s friends is essential to protect trust
information, but it is impossible if attackers have access to complete path infor-
mation. As a result PTAPS also employs a novel path-encryption and routing
mechanism. Specifically, it guarantees that if a node is represented in clear
text in a path, then its predecessor and its successor appear in encrypted form.
Moreover, a given node in a path can only decrypt information about its own
predecessor and successor. This provides each node with the ability to manipu-
late and combine paths to other nodes, while hiding the information regarding
the internal links of the path. For simplicity, we start by describing a basic
version of path encryption that only hides the links of a path, and then modify
it so that it also hides path length. Finally, we present the details of the path
encryption protocol.
Basic path encryption. Essentially, an encrypted path consists of a sequence
of routing blocks, each of them containing information about the next or the
previous hop in the path. These blocks can either be secret, i.e. the identity
of the node they refer to is encrypted, or public, i.e. the node they refer to
is unencrypted and thus publicly known. A secret routing block, fN , consists
of two sub-blocks: an identity block containing F ’s identity, and a randomly
generated block. The concatenation of the two sub-blocks is encrypted by a key
private to N . Because of this, N is the only node that can decrypt the block and
thus know that it refers to F . Also, the presence of a random-noise sub-block
means that two routing blocks encrypted by the same node N and referring to
the same node F will look different. We use the notations fn and f′n when we
need to emphasize the fact that two blocks fn and f′n, while containing the same
data, use a different random block. A public routing block f on the other hand
simply contains F ’s identity, which is not hidden or encrypted by any key.
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(01) Periodically
(02) for all F ∈ ExplicitV iew
(03) FN = encrypt(F )
(04) F ′N = encrypt(F )
(05) send Update(FN , F ′N ) to F
(06) When Update(FN , F ′N ) received by F from N
(07) NF = encrypt(N)
(08) N ′F = encrypt(N)
(09) ExplV iew[N ].Secret← NF · FN
(10) ExplV iew[N ].Pubout ← N · F ′N
(11) ExplV iew[N ].Pubin ← N ′F · F
(12) send Reply(NF , N ′F ) to N
(13) When Reply(NF , N ′F ) received by N from F
(14) ExplV iew[F ].Secret← FN ·NF
(15) ExplV iew[F ].Pubout ← F ·N ′F
(16) ExplV iew[F ].Pubin ← F ′N ·N
Algorithm 1: Maintaining Routing Information.
Since we need to be able to follow an encrypted path both forwards and
backwards, routing blocks always appear in pairs representing links. Specifically,
a link N −F contains a routing block f or fn for node F , followed by a routing
block n or nf for node N , yielding for example fnnf. The reason for reversing
the order of N and F in the link representation (e.g. fnnf) is to facilitate the
routing process. Specifically, when reading the link from left to right, the first
of the two blocks will be used by node N to identify F as a next hop. The
second block will instead used by F to identify N as a previous hop. Reversing
the link (nffn) enables navigation in the opposite direction, F using N as its
next hop, and N using F as its previous one.
This model allows us to represent any path as a sequence of links. For
example, the path consisting of the sequence of nodes A,B,C, and D can be
represented by concatenating the links A − B, B − C, and C − D, yielding
baa ·cbbc ·dcd. Note that the blocks referring to the first and last node are
public as they identify the endpoints of the path.
Those corresponding to the first and the last node are not the only blocks
in a path that may be public. Blocks corresponding to intermediary nodes may
also be public as a result of the way the path was constructed. Nonetheless,
as stated above, the goal of the protocol is to prevent an attacker, X, from
discovering the explicit friends of any other node, N , that is at least 2 hops
away. This leads to two requirements. First (i), a secret routing block referring
to a node N must never be used together with a public routing block referring
to the same node N . Second (ii), a path must never concatenate the public
routing blocks corresponding to two neighboring nodes. Rather if a node in a
path is represented by a public routing block, then both the previous and the
following nodes in the path must appear as secret blocks. In this respect, it is
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(01) Before sending a path PAZ to an explicit friend C
(02) if Z is an explicit friend of A
(03) send ExplV iew[Z].Pubout to C
(04) else
(05) Given B the node after A in PAZ
(06) PBZ ← RemoveFirstLink(PAZ)
(07) send ExplV iew[B].Secret · PBZ to C
(08) Before sending a path PAZ to an Taps node C
(09) Nothing special to do
(10) send PAZ to C
(11) When a path PBA is received by a node A from a node B with PBA.Dest = A
(12) if PAB /∈ Tapsview
(13) PAB ← ReversePath(PBA)
(14) else
(15) if PAB .trust < PBA.trust
(16) PAB ← ReversePath(PBA)
(17) When a path PBC is received by a node A from an explicit friend B
(18) // The path PBC starts by a link where B is hidden
(19) PAC ← ExplV iew[B].Pubin · PBC
(20) When a path PBC is received by a node A from an non-friend B
(21) // The path PBC starts by a link where B is public
(22) PAC ← PAB · PBC
Algorithm 2: Path management during view exchanges.
worth observing that the relevant order is that of the nodes in the path and not
that of the blocks in the path representation.
As an example, consider the path consisting of the sequence of nodes F , A,
B, C, and D in Figure 2b. The representation aff ·bab ·cbb ·dcd is allowed
(note that the node preceding B is A and not F ; likewise the one following B
is C and not D), while aff ·bab ·cbbc ·dcd is not. The first one only reveals
that F and B share a friend, and that so do B and D, but it does not give any
information about the identities of these common friends. However, the second
representation, because of the concatenation of the blocks bab and cbbc, reveals
that B is the first node of the link cbbc. If a node had both this information and
for example the path bgg·cbbc·dcd, it could see that the cbbc block is common
between the two and find out that B and G are friends because successive links
always have a common node, B in this case. If instead the two requirements
stated above are satisfied, no attack is possible as we will show in Section 4.2.
Hiding path length. As a further protection measure, PTAPS also has the abil-
ity to hide the length of an encrypted path. Specifically, a node N may use
additional encrypted blocks, nn, containing its own identifier (and the random
noise). Whenever N writes the identity of a node F either as a successor or as
a predecessor in a path, it writes the fn block followed by a random number of
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F : faf
A B C
DE
F
A : aba
E : ede
D : cbb ·dcd E : dcc ·ede
D : dcd
F : abb ·faf A : bcc ·aba
(a) Step 1
A B C
DE
F
F : abb ·faf E : dcc ·ede
F : cdd ·bcb ·abb ·faf
A : bccb ·abaF : abb ·faf
D : cbbc ·dcd
·cbbc ·dcd
B : aff ·bab
D : cbb ·dcd
D : aff ·bab ·cbb ·dcd
A : bcc ·aba
A : cdd ·bccb ·aba
D : cbb ·dcd
B : baa
(b) Step 2
Figure 2: Building routing information.
copies of the nn block (each with a different noise sub-block), thus making it
impossible for another node to guess the length of a path.
Due to path reversal, a sequence of blocks to be decrypted may have either
of two forms: fn,nn, ...,nn, or nn, ...,nn, fn. Moreover it can be followed either
by a block fn encrypted by n or by a block encrypted by a different node. To
decrypt it, n continues to decrypt blocks until it has found a block of type fn
with F 6= N and has reached either a block encrypted by a different node, or a
block of type sn with S 6= N,F . In the latter case, it leaves sn in the path for
later decryption. To simplify the presentation of the protocol, in the rest of the
paper, we ignore the use of nn blocks to hide path length. Their integration in
the descriptions and pseudocode that follow is conceptually simple and is thus
left to the reader.
Path-encryption details. Algorithms 1 to 3 provide the details of the path-
encryption protocol. Each node, N , maintains three additional fields for each
entry, F , in its explicit view. The first is an outgoing public link to F , Pubout =
fnf, which will be used to construct encrypted paths with F as an endpoint.
The second is an incoming public link to N , Pubin = fnn, which will be used
in paths that have N as an endpoint. Finally, the last field is a secret link,
Secret = fnnf, which will be used for paths in which neither N nor F is an
endpoint.
To initialize these fields, N sends an Update message to F carrying two
blocks containing the identity of F . The first secret block, fn, will be used to
create the secret link between N and F . The second one, f′n, will be used
to build the public link referring to N . Upon receiving these blocks, F also
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(01) To send an application message M to X through the path PX
(02) NextBlock ← GetFirstBlock(PX)
(03) NextHop← ExtractIdentity(NextBlock)
(04) P ′X ← RemoveFirstBlock(PX)
(05) send AppMsg(M , P ′X) to NextHop.
(06) When AppMsg(M , PX) received from Sender
(07) PreviousBlock ← GetFirstBlock(PX)
(08) PreviousHop← ExtractIdentity(PreviousBlock)
(09) if Sender 6= PreviousHop
(10) return
(11) P ′X ← RemoveFirstBlock(PX)
(12) if P ′X = ∅
(13) deliver M
(14) else
(15) NextBlock ← GetFirstBlock(P ′X)
(16) NextHop← ExtractIdentity(NextBlock)
(17) P ′′X ← RemoveFirstBlock(P ′X)
(18) send AppMsg(M , P ′′X) to NextHop.
Algorithm 3: Sending and Relaying Application Messages.
generates a pair nf and n′f and sends it back to N . Then the two nodes have
the material to create the three encrypted links needed by the protocol, as
described in Algorithm 1.
After initialization, nodes operate as in the TAPS2 protocol when exchang-
ing information from their respective taps views. However, some special actions
are needed depending on the type of exchanges outlined in Sections 3.3 and 4.1.1.
The first type of exchanges, explicit-explicit, involve a node that sends in-
formation about an explicit friend to another explicit friend. Consider node C
in Figure 2a sending information about its friend F to its other friend D. First,
C sends D the outgoing public link in its routing-table entry for F , fcf (lines
2 and 3, in Algorithm 2). Upon receiving this link, D concatenates it with the
incoming public link in its routing table entry for C , cdd. This yields the path
abb ·faf (lines 17-19 in Algorithm 2).
The second type of exchanges, taps-explicit, involve a node that sends a
path leading to a taps-view node to an explicit friend. As an example, consider
again node C sending a path leading to A to its friend D. Also, let B be the
intermediate node in this path: bcc ·aba. Node C cannot send this path to D
as it is. If it were to do so, D would combine it with an incoming public link,
cdd, and would break privacy, since the path cdd ·bcc ·aba contains node C
both in a secret and in a public block, disclosing the fact that cd refers to C.
Thus, C sends a modified path, where it replaces the public link bcc by the
secret one, bccb, yielding bccb ·aba. Node D can then concatenate this path
to cdd, yielding cdd ·bccb ·aba, which does not pose any privacy problem.
The final type of exchanges are those in which a node N sends information
to a node from its taps view. As explained in Section 4.1.1, PTAPS forbids
explicit-taps exchanges. Therefore, the only content of an interaction with a
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node from the taps view is always information extracted itself from the taps
view. These are easier to handle and require no special processing since paths
contained in the taps view (and also in the tac one) all start and end with
a public link. This means that they can be concatenated without any special
actions. As an example, consider again Figure 2a. This time, node C wishes to
inform node E about a path to A. As in the standard TAPS [1] and TAPS2
protocols, C provides E with a path C → A (bcc·aba) as well as with a C → E
(dcc ·ede) path. Node E can then combine C → A with the best path to C it
has, either one it already had or the reverse of the C → E it just received. In
the latter case, E simply takes the blocks of the received path in reverse order
yielding dee ·cdc. It then combines this E → C path with the C → A path it
received, yielding dee ·cdcbcc ·aba.
Encrypted paths clearly allow routing of application messages. These in-
clude the verification message described in Section 2.2.3, or messages employed
to establish transactions between nodes. The routing algorithm is given in Al-
gorithm 3. Consider node F in Figure 2b wishing to send a message along
its path to node D. Node F picks the first block of the path and extract the
identity of the node it contains (line 03). Since the identity of a node is either
encrypted or in clear form, extracting it from a block means either decrypting it
or simply returning the clear-text value in the block. The identity extracted by
F indicates that A is the next node on the path, thus F forwards the message
to A along with the path stripped of the first block. Upon reception, node A
reads the first block of the received path (line 08), which confirms that F is
a previous hop. Then, because the path contains more blocks, A proceeds by
extracting its next hop (line 16). The process goes on until the message reaches
D, which reads the last block of the path on line 08, confirming node C as a
previous hop, and then delivers the message at line 13.
Finally it is worth observing that maintaining routing tables at each node
with a predecessor and a successor along each path would quickly lead to a waste
of storage resources. TAPS exchanges lead to the creation of a huge number of
paths, many of which are simply discarded when better paths are found. While
stale paths could, in principle, be garbage collected, this would require expensive
coordination among a large number of distant nodes, and would become almost
impossible in the presence of churn.
4.1.3. Strong Threshold
In addition to encrypting paths and restricting the dissemination of infor-
mation about the trust values on explicit links, PTAPS also reinforces the trust
threshold we introduced in Section 3.2. Specifically, TAPS2 removes from a
node’s view all the nodes whose trust values are below the threshold, but it
allows the node to exchange information with them, possibly providing them
with trust information about itself and other nodes. PTAPS , on the other
hand, also forbids such exchanges by ignoring all the communication arriving
from nodes whose trust value is below the threshold and by suppressing all out-
going communication towards the same nodes. While this additional measure is
not necessary to prevent nodes from discovering trust values on explicit links, it
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contributes to limit the ability of attackers to build even an approximate map
of the network’s trust values by enventually confining nodes’ communication
to the part of the network where there are sufficiently trusted. Finally, it is
important to observe that in PTAPS , the trust threshold becomes the primary
mechanism for limiting the length of trusted paths, due to the impossibility to
perform on-line shortcuts in the presence of encrypted path information.
4.2. Privacy preservation in PTAPS
We now analyze PTAPS ’s ability to provide strong privacy guarantees by
hiding the direct trust values between explicit friends. Intuitively, this ability is
provided by the non-disclosure of explicit friends discussed in Section 4.1.1. In
the following, we formalize it by clearly specifying the hypothesis under which
PTAPS ’s strong guarantees hold.
Extracting information from a single path. We begin by showing that an at-
tacker cannot extract information about direct links between nodes by examin-
ing a single path.
A B I
K
J
tBK ?
?tBI
Figure 3: If tbk ≥ tbi · tij, A can’t guess if the path goes through I or K.
Lemma 1. In the routing information provided during path exchanges, if a
node’s information appears in clear form, then the previous and next nodes (if
any) have their routing information hidden.
Proof. The proof relies on the following observations:
• explicit-explicit exchanges, which constitute the bootstrap process, ensure
that the routing information associated with paths of length two hides the in-
termediary node;
• taps-explicit exchanges ensure that the identities of the second and second-to-
last nodes in a path remain hidden after the exchange;
• taps-taps exchanges, which comprise path-reversal and concatenation opera-
tions, also preserve the property of the lemma because the endpoints of the
paths being concatenated are always represented by public blocks.
As a result, for every path, the identity of at least one node every two remains hidden
during all exchanges, thereby proving the lemma.
Lemma 1
Corollary 1. An attacker cannot guess the existence of a direct link in the
explicit social network from the routing information contained in a path.
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Remark: The identities encrypted by the attacker itself in paths are those of
its friends. Consequently, even if the attacker can read this information, it can
only discover links that join one of its friends to another node, but these links
are already disclosed during explicit-explicit exchanges.
Extracting information from multiple paths. Next, we present a set of results
that show that an attacker cannot extract information about direct links by
trying to identify common path subsequences in two paths. These results cover
cases in which an attacker gathers a finite number of paths and combines them in
pairs by trying to identify that one path is a subpath of the other. However, they
do not cover situations in which an attacker can gather some form of exhaustive
knowledge about the paths in the network: for example by being sure to have
collected all the two-hop paths starting from a node it wishes to attack.
It is easy to see that the only combination of two paths that might lead to the
identification of a direct link consists of a path, p1, and a path p2 corresponding
to p1 with the addition of a final node J. Lemmas 2 and 3 prove that even this
combination cannot leak friendship information. Their proofs, as well as those
of the theorem and corollary that follow, rely on a few standard assumptions
on the cryptographic algorithms used to encrypt routing blocks.
• It is impossible to tell which key was used to encrypt a block without
having the appropriate key.
• It is impossible to tell if two blocks were encrypted with two different keys
without being able to decrypt at least one of them.
• It is impossible to tell whether two blocks encrypted with different keys
contain the same information.
Lemma 2. Let A be an attacker that has the knowledge of two paths p1 = ABI
and p2 = ABIJ along with their associated routing information. If neither I
nor J is a friend of A, and if B has at least another friend K such that: (i) K is
different from A, I, and J , (ii) K is not a friend of A, and (iii) tBK ≥ tBI · tIJ ,
then A cannot guess the existence of link I − J .
Proof. Because of the behavior of explicit-explicit exchanges, the routing infor-
mation of path p1 is b’aa · ib’i, while that for path p2 is b’aa · ibbi · jb’j. For A , it is
therefore impossible to detect that ib’i and ibbi refer to the same link. First A does
not have B ’s key and is thus unable to match block ib with block i. Second, she does
not have I ’s key either, and thus the routing blocks bi and b′i also look different to
her. This means that because of the hypothesis that B has another friend K 6= A, I,J,
A cannot distinguish the routing information for p2 from that associated with a path
p′2 = ABKJ. Moreover, because A is not a friend of K, she cannot exclude the ex-
istence of link K − J. As a result, the only way for A to establish that p2 is not
p′2 would be to rely on trust values, and realize that the trust value associated with
the link B − K is too low for p′2 to have the same trust value as p2. However, this
would require the trust value of B −K to be tBK < tBI · tIJ , which contradicts the
hypothesis. This proves that A cannot identify if p2 goes through I or through K,
and thus cannot guess the existence of the link between I and J .
Lemma 2
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Lemma 3. Let A be an attacker that knows two paths p1 = B1 . . . BnI, n ≥ 2
and p2 = B1 . . . BnIJ . If A /∈ {B1, . . . , Bn, I, J} and if neither Bn, I nor J is
a friend of A, then A cannot guess the existence of link I − J .
Proof. The routing information of p1 ends with the blocks ib’ni, while that of
p2 ends either with the blocks ibnbni · ji’j, or with the blocks i’bnbn · ji’j. We now
prove that the attacker is unable to match the two paths because the corresponding
blocks in their final links differ. First, i differs from its encrypted counterpart ibn .
Second, b’ni differs both from its its unencrypted counterpart bn and from bni. The
encrypted block for Bn appearing in public links, b’ni, is, in fact, different from the
one appearing in secret links, bni, as described in Section 4.1.2.
In addition A is neither a friend of Bn nor a friend of J, thus it has no way to
exclude that path p2 contains ends, for example, by the sequence Bn −K− J. This,
proves that she cannot determine whether p2 contains a link between I and J .
Lemma 3
Remark: The lemma trivially holds with the same arguments if p1 = IBn . . .B1
and p2 = JIBn . . .B1.
Lemmas 2 and 3 state the hypotheses required to prevent attacks from a spe-
cific attacker. In the following we provide sufficient conditions that are valid
regardless of the attacker.
Theorem 1. Let I and J be two explicit friends such that: (i) neither I nor
J is friends with a malicious node, (ii) each friend of I has at least two other
friends 6= J which are not friends with each other and that it trusts at least
as much as I, and (iii) each friend of J has at least two other friends 6= I
which are not friends with each other and that it trusts at least as much as J .
Then, no attacker, regardless of its position in the network, can discover with
certainty that a given path contains an explicit link between I and J through any
combination of two paths.
Proof. From the hypotheses, it immediately follows that, if the attacker and I (resp.
J) have a common friend, then this has at least one friend K 6= A, I,J which it trusts
at least as much as I (resp. J) and which is not friends with A. Thus the hypotheses
of Lemmas 2 and 3 are verified for any attacker A.
Theorem 1
Corollary 2. If every node in the network gives its maximum trust value to
at least three of its friends which are not friends with each other, then given
any two explicit friends I and J that are not friends with malicious nodes, no
attacker can discover with certainty that a given path contains an explicit link
between I and J .
Proof. It is easy to observe that the fact that each node has at least three friends
which are not friends with each other and which have the same highest trust values
makes it possible to find, for each friend of I’s (resp. J’s), one friend which is (i) at
least as trusted as I (resp. J), (ii) not equal to J (resp. I) or A , and (iii) not friends
with A. This verifies the hypotheses of Theorem 1. Corollary 2
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The above results precisely describe the circumstances that prevent an at-
tacker from discovering the existence of friendship relationships. Specifically,
Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 guarantee that an attacker cannot extract link or
trust information from a single path. Lemma 2, Lemma 3, Theorem 1, and
Corollary 2 extend this guarantee to an attacker trying to extract information
from the combination of two paths.
5. Evaluation
5.1. Setting
We evaluated our protocols on real data traces consisting of 3000 users ex-
tracted from the Facebook and Digg social websites. The Facebook trace3 con-
tains friendship links and a list of social interactions. To obtain a treatable
subset for our experiments, we first cleaned up the trace by removing all the
users that had only one friend, as they would be too isolated to benefit from
our social platform. We then selected the user with the largest number of in-
teractions and proceeded in a spiral fashion by selecting her friends, then the
friends of her friends, and so on, until we reached 3000 users. We associated
each of these users with a random user profile from the Digg social network. We
obtained these profiles by crawling Digg in late 2010.
Friendship links in the Facebook trace and profiles in the Digg trace provided
the base of explicit links and profiles for our experiments. On top of them,
we built several traces by varying the trust patterns between the nodes. We
distinguish our traces into two groups: binary and multi-valued. In both, we
make the assumption that the number of interactions between two nodes is a
measure of trust (this assumption is not part of the protocol itself).
Our choice of a random mapping between traces is due to the absence, to
the best of our knowledge, of a real trace combining profiles and trust informa-
tion. The random mapping may in fact underestimate performance. TAPS [1],
TAPS2 , and PTAPS are particularly good at discovering trusted paths toward
close nodes in the explicit social network and, as shown in [9], friends in a social
network tend to be more similar to each other than to random nodes.
Binary traces. In binary traces we assigned a binary trust value to each link in
the data set. Specifically, we sorted the friends of each user according to the
number of interactions she had with them. Then, for a user with |N | friends, we
assigned a trust value of 1 to the β|N | directed links with the largest number
of interactions. As this process creates asymmetric trust values, we then set
the symmetric trust value of each link as the logical OR of the two asymmetric
values. This leads to the proportions of trusted links depicted in Figure 4a.
3Network A at http://current.cs.ucsb.edu/facebook/index.html.
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Multivalued traces. While binary traces provide a simple experimental setting,
reality tends to be more complex. Thus, we also considered traces with trust
values of 1, 0.8, 0.5, and 0. Similar to the binary case, we sorted each user’s
friends by the number of interactions and assigned a trust value of 1 to the top
γ1|N |, 0.8 to the following γ0.8|N | and so on, leading to the traces in Figure 4b.
5.2. Terms of Comparison
We compared the performance of our TAPS protocols with several alter-
natives. Best is an ideal system that, powered with global knowledge, always
provides each user with the set of neighbors that offer the best combination of
similarity and trust. This allows us to assess the ability of our TAPS variants
to reach similar results in a decentralized way. Similar consists of a standard
similarity-based implicit network [4], augmented with an oracle providing the
best trusted paths to neighbors. This maximizes profile similarity at the cost
of possibly lower trust. Finally, Trusted selects the most trustworthy nodes,
providing very high trust, but possibly poor similarity. In all experiments, we
compute the average scores of the tac views over all nodes using each of the
TAPS variants, as well as Similar and Trusted . Then, we normalize each of
these averages by dividing it by the average score over all nodes obtained by
Best , which provides optimal views. Unless otherwise specified, we used default
values for τ and : τ = 0.75 balances trust decay and path length (0.56 at 3
hops, 0.23 at 6), and  = 1 gives a fair tradeoff between trust and similarity.
5.3. Results
Impact of trust density. We start our performance comparison by examining
the results obtained in the various traces to highlight the effect of the number
of trusted links. Figure 5 shows the average score values in the tac views with
TAPS2 and PTAPS as well as with their competitors as percentages of the
scores of Best . TAPS2 ’s and PTAPS ’s performances are always better than
those obtained by Similar and Trusted with the use of global knowledge. As
expected, they particularly outperform Similar whenever the social network has
a limited proportion of high-trust links (Binary0.4 and Multi-valued1). This can
be explained by observing that Similar always selects the nodes with the best
similarity and is therefore penalized in networks with lower trust density. On the
other hand, Trusted performs best with a low trust density, but its performance
remains bad in any configuration. We also observe that PTAPS ’s performance
is only slightly below that of TAPS2 , and that both protocols achieve stable
behaviors across all traces with respect to Best, contrary to Similar and Trusted .
Impact of trust transitivity. Figure 6 confirms the above observations by exam-
ining the impact of trust transitivity, τ , in the Binary-0.8 and MultiValued-1
traces. The performance of both our protocols is particularly good when trust
decays faster as this gives more importance to nodes that are closer in the social
network even if they may be less similar. This suggests that our TAPS proto-
cols are particularly suited for important transactions and situations in which
people can tolerate only limited amounts of risk.
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Name β % 1 % 0
Binary-0.4 0.4 53.5 46.5
Binary-0.6 0.6 71.3 28.7
Binary-0.8 0.8 89.3 10.7
(a) Binary Traces
Name % 1 % 0.8 % 0.5 % 0
MultiValued-1 41.3 23.8 23.4 11.5
MultiValued-2 57.4 27.9 13.3 1.4
MultiValued-3 76.2 12.3 10.1 1.4
(b) Multi-valued Traces
Figure 4: Trust values distribution for different traces.
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Figure 5: Impact of trust density.
With very high values of τ , trust decays more slowly. In this case, a protocol
like Similar that selects the most similar nodes before searching for a trusted
path may be viable. However, Similar achieves this through global knowledge.
A distributed protocol to compute trusted paths would probably be either very
costly or ultimately equivalent our TAPS family in networks characterized by
high trust densities. Moreover, such a protocol would remain weak in situations
where the density of trusted links is low, as shown in Figure 5.
The plots also show that the importance of short-circuiting cyclic paths is
greater when τ is high. High τ values make it possible for the protocols to
select nodes that are farther away in the social network, which, in turn, makes
the presence of cycles more likely. This effect is mitigated by TAPS2 ’s ability
to take shortcuts, but it is clearly visible in PTAPS , which does not support
on-line shortcuts.
Impact of trust weight. Next, we evaluate the impact of the trust-weight fac-
tor. Figure 7 shows the results in the Binary-0.8 (left) and Multi-valued-1
(right) traces respectively. Both plots show that the benefits of a protocol
like TAPS2/PTAPS become more important as we place more weight on trust.
With values of 1 or above, TAPS2 and PTAPS perform better than Similar and
reach almost optimal results with  = 1.5, while Trusted is only able to achieve
acceptable results with a very high value of . Similar to Figure 6, Figure 7 also
highlights that the benefits of shortcuts are greater when the similarity between
nodes is more important than trust. The difference in performance between
TAPS2 and PTAPS decreases as the impact of trust increases.
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Figure 6: Impact of τ in the Binary0.8 (left) and Multi-valued-1 (right) traces.
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Figure 7: Impact of  in the Binary0.8 (left) and Multi-valued1 (right) traces.
Impact of the biased view and the trust threshold. We now concentrate on the
components of our protocols and analyze the impact of biased views and of the
trust threshold on TAPS2 and PTAPS on the MultiValued-2 trace. Figure 8
highlights that biasing view selection significantly improves the performance of
both TAPS2 and PTAPS by directing the exploration of the network toward
highly trusted links. The trust threshold complements this by obtaining an ad-
ditional increment in performance. The presence of the trust threshold becomes
even more critical if we disable the biased-view-selection feature. The thresh-
old alone, even if not as effectively as when biasing view selection, prevents
non-trustworthy nodes from entering a node’s view.
Comparison with TAPS [1]. Figure 8 also shows a comparison between TAPS2 ,
PTAPS and TAPS [1]. It is clear that TAPS2 strongly outperforms TAPS [1].
Even in its simplest version, without the biased view and the trust threshold,
TAPS2 remains slightly better than TAPS [1] thanks to the additional ex-
changes. PTAPS trades off most of the performance improvements of TAPS2
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Figure 9: Cumulative distributions of the local clustering coefficients (left) and
of the in-degree (right) distributions for TAPS -based and standard protocols.
for its privacy guarantees. Yet, it remains slightly better than TAPS [1] when
all its features are enabled even though it does not use the shortcut mechanism.
Graph properties of TAPS. We conclude our evaluation by examining the graph
properties of our TAPS overlays. We do not show PTAPS because its results are
almost indistinguishable from those of TAPS2 . Figure 9a shows the cumulative
distributions of the local clustering coefficients of the nodes in the taps and
tac views for both TAPS [1] and TAPS2 and compares them with those of a
standard peer sampling protocol coupled with a clustering protocol (RPS and
Similar Cluster). The plot shows that TAPS [1]’s topology is very close to a
random one, while TAPS2 ’s is clearly more clustered. This is a clear effect of
TAPS2 ’s biased view selection which tends to favor more trustworthy nodes
and suggests the use of TAPS2/PTAPS for better performance/privacy and of
TAPS [1] if sharing the overlay with non-trust-aware applications. The plot
also shows that the tac views generated by both TAPS2 and TAPS [1] are less
dense than those of Similar as very similar nodes that form tight clusters in
Similar may not be connected by highly trusted links.
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The in-degree distribution shown in Figure 9b also shows some differences
with respect to traditional protocols. In this case, TAPS2 and TAPS [1] produce
very similar results, but are quite different from the RPS views. The in-degree
distribution of taps views is in fact slightly skewed because nodes that are not
trusted by many others tend to have fewer neighbors. This is indeed desirable
as untrusted nodes could potentially harm the system through illicit behaviors.
Finally, we observe that the indegree distribution for the tac views does not
show any significant variation among TAPS2 , TAPS [1], and Similar .
6. Related Work
The concept of trust in explicit social networks has been exploited in domains
ranging from peer-to-peer security to recommendation systems. SybilGuard [10]
and SybilLimit [11] propose protocols that exploit trust relationships between
friends to protect peer-to-peer systems from sybil attacks. Reliable Email [12]
uses a similar approach to build an email-whitelisting system based on friend-to-
friend relationships, while Ostra [13] exploits social trust to limit the incidence
of unwanted communication in messaging and content-sharing systems.
NABT [14] proposes the use of trust between friends to prevent freeriding
behaviors using a more efficient form of tit-for-tat based on indirect trust re-
lationships. NABT’s credit-based approach can be viewed as a basic form of
trust inference between friends of friends. A more advanced approach is adopted
by SUNNY [15], a centralized protocol that takes into account both trust and
confidence to build a Bayesian network. Even if SUNNY is centralized, its
confidence-based idea could lead to interesting improvements for TAPS .
A number of research efforts have instead investigated the use of trust links
to improve the performance of recommendation systems. The work in [16] uses
an approach similar to that of [15], while TrustWalker [17] combines trust and
item-based collaborative filtering. TaRS [18] builds a recommendation system
capable of operating both with global and with local trust metrics. Global
trust metrics [19] predict a global reputation value for each node. Local trust
metrics [20], on the other hand, take an approach similar to ours and compute
trust values that are dependent on the target user.
Despite the mole of work on social trust, Social Market is, to the best of our
knowledge, the first system to propose the use of trust relationships to build a
decentralized interest-based marketplace. Similarly, TAPS , originally published
in [1], TAPS2 , and PTAPS constitute the first protocols to combine explicit and
implicit social networks into a single gossip-based system. Existing research on
gossip protocols has addressed a number of problems including data dissemina-
tion [21], aggregation [22], and overlay construction and maintenance [23, 8]. In
this context, the two contributions that are most closely related to our work are
[24], which uses gossip to disseminate news in explicit networks, and [4], which
proposed the use of gossip for implicit ones.
Finally, our path-encryption mechanism shares similar aspects with onion-
routing approaches [25]. In our protocol however, the endpoints of a path need
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to be able to reverse paths, and, most importantly, they must not know the
identities of the nodes in a path, making the use of [25] impossible.
7. Conclusions
We presented Social Market (SM), a novel distributed application enabling
trusted collaborative actions between similar people in a social-network envi-
ronment. We proposed a solution to the challenges posed by SM with a family
of novel protocols, TAPS , TAPS2 , and PTAPS , which create RPS-like overlays
taking into account the mutual trust expressed by users when joining an explicit
social network. TAPS2 and PTAPS provide significant improvements with re-
spect to our previous work on TAPS both in terms of performance and privacy.
While TAPS2 focuses on finding nodes with the best trust values, PTAPS also
provides strong privacy guarantees by hiding the existence of explicit links from
nodes that are at more than two hops from them.
Our results encourage us to extend Social Market and the TAPS family in
a number of ways. First, we are currently evaluating whether the protection
offered by PTAPS can be extended to combinations of more than two paths.
Second, we are working on extensions capable of addressing situations in which
attackers may inject false information with the aim of polluting other nodes’
views or of detecting the presence of links between people. A third direction
we are considering is to extend our protocol family to networks characterized
by asymmetric trust values as opposed to symmetric ones. This would make it
possible to render trust information even more private as users would not need
to disclose to their friends the trust they have for them. Both with symmetric
and asymmetric trust values, it would also be interesting to explore the use
of multiple redundant trusted paths as a way to limit the effects of colluding
attackers, which cannot be tolerated by the protocols in this paper. From a
systems perspective, we instead plan to evaluate and possibly improve the per-
formance of our protocols in the presence of churn, for example by having nodes
rely on trusted peers to disseminate information while disconnected. Finally,
we aim to integrate TAPS in our existing prototype applications within the
Gossple project as a way to reinforce the trust of users in disseminated infor-
mation, recommendations, and ultimately in the implementation of a real-world
social-market platform.
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